Norfolk Southern Rejects Canadian Pacific’s Takeover Bid

Norfolk Southern Corp. unanimously rejected Canadian Pacific’s previously-announced unsolicited, low-premium, non-binding, highly conditional indication of interest to acquire the company.

After a comprehensive review, conducted in consultation with its financial and legal advisors, the Norfolk Southern board concluded that the indication of interest is grossly inadequate, creates substantial regulatory risks and uncertainties that are highly unlikely to be overcome, and is not in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders.
After a comprehensive review, conducted in consultation with its financial and legal advisors, the Norfolk Southern board concluded that the indication of interest is grossly inadequate, creates substantial regulatory risks and uncertainties that are highly unlikely to be overcome, and is not in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders.

Norfolk Southern Corp. unanimously rejected Canadian Pacific’s previously-announced unsolicited, low-premium, non-binding, highly conditional indication of interest to acquire the Company for $46.72 in cash and a fixed exchange ratio of 0.348 shares in a new company that would own Canadian Pacific and Norfolk Southern. After a comprehensive review, conducted in consultation with its financial and legal advisors, the Norfolk Southern board concluded that the indication of interest is grossly inadequate, creates substantial regulatory risks and uncertainties that are highly unlikely to be overcome, and is not in the best interest of the Company and its shareholders.

“We believe in our ability to generate greater shareholder value through execution of our strategy – delivering efficient and superior service to build a more profitable franchise based on price and volume growth, implementing efficiency measures, and increasing returns on capital to strengthen our financial performance, all while maintaining our disciplined capital return strategy,” said Chairman, President and CEO James A. Squires. “Norfolk Southern has made growth investments and we expect to realize the benefits of these investments in the years ahead, especially as our intermodal volumes continue to build. Specifically, we expect to achieve an operating ratio below 70 in 2016 with additional improvements over the next five years resulting in increasing ROE and an operating ratio below 65 by 2020. By maximizing our asset utilization, we believe we can achieve double-digit compounded EPS growth over this period. In short, Norfolk Southern is well positioned to deliver compelling value to our shareholders.”

Squires continued, “There is a high probability that, after years of disruption and expense, the proposed combination would be rejected by the Surface Transportation Board (STB). We also believe the STB would reject Canadian Pacific’s proposed voting trust structure, and that there is no certainty that any other voting trust structure would be approved. Even if the proposed combination were ultimately to be cleared, it would be subject to a wide range of onerous conditions that would reduce the value of the stock consideration that has been proposed.”

Squires concluded, “We believe that Canadian Pacific’s short-term, cut-to-the-bone strategy could cause Norfolk Southern to lose substantial revenues from our service-sensitive customer base. We also believe the proposed transaction risks harm to vital transportation infrastructure and the communities we serve. Any strategy that hurts our customers and the broader community is highly unlikely to receive regulatory approval and is inconsistent with the delivery of shareholder value over the long-term.”

The Norfolk Southern board, composed of 13 directors, 11 of whom are independent, undertook a comprehensive review of the Canadian Pacific proposal. The Norfolk Southern board, in making its determination, considered among other factors:

The Canadian Pacific indication of interest substantially undervalues Norfolk Southern.

  • Norfolk Southern, under the direction of its board of directors and a recently appointed chief executive officer, is successfully executing a strategic plan to drive operational improvements. The board is confident that the continued execution of this strategic plan is superior to Canadian Pacific’s grossly inadequate and high-risk proposal
  • The board believes that Canadian Pacific’s indication of interest is opportunistically timed to take advantage of a Norfolk Southern market valuation that has been adversely affected by a challenging commodity price environment, does not fully reflect infrastructure investments Norfolk Southern has made, and does not incorporate the upside from further improvements anticipated to result from the initiatives that the Company is implementing.

Norfolk Southern is successfully executing on its strategy. 

  • Norfolk Southern’s management team is successfully executing a number of revenue growth initiatives focused on pricing discipline and growth in merchandise and intermodal market opportunities.
  • Norfolk Southern’s strategic plan is focused on providing superior customer service, continuing the recent improvement in network performance, and implementing efficiency measures, including managing headcount, increasing locomotive productivity, and integrating technological innovations.
  • Norfolk Southern’s strategic plan provides for double-digit compounded EPS growth over the next five years, increasing ROE, and, by 2020, an operating ratio below 65.
  • Norfolk Southern is committed to pursuing a disciplined capital allocation strategy while investing appropriately in its network. Over the past 10 years, since the inception of its share repurchase program, the Company has distributed nearly $15 billion to shareholders, consisting of an average of approximately $1 billion in share repurchases per year and a steadily increasing dividend with a 10-year annual compound growth rate of 14 percent. 

The transaction would face substantial regulatory risks and uncertainties that are highly unlikely to be overcome. 

The board believes that the proposed transaction is unlikely to be completed given the substantial regulatory risks. Notably, any transaction must be determined by the STB to both “enhance competition” and be in the “public interest”.

Given the extended review process of two years or more and the uncertainty of approval, there would be significant disruption to Norfolk Southern’s business and operations. 

The Norfolk Southern board also believes that in the event the transaction did close, it would be only after the imposition of substantial regulatory conditions compromising the potential benefits of a combination and reducing the value of the proposed stock consideration.

There is no certainty that the STB would approve a voting trust - the voting trust structure proposed by Canadian Pacific is unprecedented and likely would not be approved.

  • Contrary to Canadian Pacific’s claims, a voting trust under which a transaction would close prior to final STB approval of the merger would not protect Norfolk Southern shareholders from regulatory uncertainty. Under STB rules established in 2001, any voting trust would require both a public comment period and approval by the STB based on a finding that the voting trust itself is in the public interest. There is no certainty that the STB would approve use of a voting trust.
  • The voting trust structure proposed by Canadian Pacific is unprecedented, and it is highly likely it would be rejected by the STB because the Canadian Pacific management team would control or be substantially involved in the operations of Norfolk Southern prior to receiving regulatory approval of the proposed merger transaction.

The proposed transaction would be detrimental to Norfolk Southern’s customer base and communities.

Canadian Pacific’s unilateral open access proposal would undercut the financial performance of the combined entity as well as degrade service and dis-incentivize investment. 

Any strategy that adversely impacts Norfolk Southern’s service-sensitive customer base and communities is unlikely to receive regulatory approval and is inconsistent with the delivery of shareholder value over the long-term.

Canadian Pacific’s synergy targets are overstated and imply significant reduction in investment to maintain service.

Canadian Pacific’s overstated synergy targets imply significant reduction to investment and employment levels, which the board believes would harm service levels and would be unacceptable to the STB.

Operating synergies are limited because the Canadian Pacific and Norfolk Southern networks serve entirely separate regions and only connect at five points. 

Any near-term cost savings that might result from applying Canadian Pacific’s short-term focused operating model on Norfolk Southern would be offset by traffic diversions, service deterioration and loss of service-sensitive customers. 

Open access has been widely documented to produce negative revenue synergies from traffic loss and rate compression while also increasing operating costs.

The transaction would not help Chicago congestion issues.

  • As the smallest Class 1 railroad in Chicago, accounting for less than 5 percent of all Chicago rail traffic, Canadian Pacific’s volumes are too small to impact Chicago rail traffic.
  • The proposed transaction would likely increase Chicago congestion.

Less than 15 percent – or less than one train per day – of current Canadian Pacific-Norfolk Southern connecting traffic can be efficiently rerouted around Chicago.

Further, Norfolk Southern believes that the proposed transaction would cause more, not less, traffic congestion in Chicago. We expect Canadian Pacific would increase revenues by converting interline traffic between Norfolk Southern and both BNSF Railway (BNSF) and Union Pacific (UP) to single-line traffic in the proposed Canadian Pacific-Norfolk Southern system. Much of this Norfolk Southern traffic with BNSF and UP avoids Chicago today. Unlike BNSF and UP, Canadian Pacific does not have efficient Chicago bypass routes, so Canadian Pacific would have to route most of this traffic through Chicago.

  • Not only do the lines of Canadian Pacific and Norfolk Southern not physically connect in Chicago, but neither company’s traffic can be moved to other Canadian Pacific-Norfolk Southern connecting points without all constituencies incurring substantial extra miles, cost and time.
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